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CIVIL ACTIONS UNDER ERISA SECTION 502(a): WHEN
SHOULD COURTS REQUIRE THAT CLAIMANTS
EXHAUST ARBITRAL OR INTRAFUND
REMEDIES?
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ER-
ISA) ' preempted state regulation of employee benefit plans2 and es-
tablished federal standards to govern their administration. ERISA
section 502(a) (1)(B) provides a federal forum for plan participants3
alleging an improper denial of benefits under the terms of a plan.
4
Section 502(a)(3) permits participants to obtain relief for violations
of ERISA's substantive standards of conduct.5 In enacting section
502(a), Congress sought to protect plan participants and enhance
enforcement of ERISA's standards.
ERISA further requires that all employee benefit plans include
claims procedures that provide participants with access to internal
review of benefit denials by plan administrators. 6 Collectively bar-
gained benefit plans generally incorporate arbitration agreements as
1 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 and in
scattered sections of the I.R.C. (1982)).
2 ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982). See infra note 73 and accompanying
text.
3 ERISA § 502 provides both participants and beneficiaries of employee benefit
plans with access to federal courts. Solely for the sake of brevity, this Note only uses the
term "participants." Throughout, the rights accorded plan participants extend equally
to plan beneficiaries.
4 ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) provides in relevant part:
A civil action may be brought-
(1) by a participant or benefidary-
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his
rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan[.]
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1982).
5 ERISA § 502(a)(3) provides in relevant part:
A civil action may be brought-
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or
practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of
the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress
such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the
terms of the plan[.]
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1982).
6 ERISA § 503, 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1982). See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
The Secretary of Labor has promulgated regulations which state the minimum accept-
able procedures for internal claims review. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (1985). See infra
notes 7 & 122. Plan administrators performing such review are subject to ERISA's stan-
dards of fiduciary conduct. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
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a means of internally settling benefit disputes.7 ERISA does not
make clear when courts should require that claimants exhaust ad-
ministrative procedures, be they internal administrator review or ar-
bitration, prior to bringing an action under section 502(a). Nor
does the Act define the deference courts should accord the outcome
of these proceedings in a subsequent ERISA suit. Traditionally,
courts favor administrative resolution of labor disputes by requiring
that claimants exhaust arbitral procedures before the courts will ex-
ercise jurisdiction. For instance, under section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act,8 courts insist on exhaustion of adminis-
trative procedures and typically defer to the resulting award in a
subsequent suit. Thus, ERISA's civil enforcement provisions create
a dilemma for courts, for they must reconcile the dual goals of def-
erence to administrative decisions and judicial enforcement of ER-
ISA's statutory rights. Courts must decide whether to require that
an ERISA claimant exhaust administrative procedures and what ef-
fect such proceedings should have on subsequent litigation. Unsur-
prisingly, courts grappling with this problem have reached
divergent results.
This Note examines the foundations of the federal policy favor-
ing administrative resolution of labor disputes. Next, it surveys
cases attempting to reconcile this policy with ERISA's provisions
providing benefit plan participants access to federal courts. Finally,
the Note proposes an accommodation of these seemingly incompat-
ible aims. ERISA's legislative history and statutory goals suggest
that courts should focus on the nature of the claimant's cause of
action. If the claim centers on eligibility for benefits under the plan's
terms, the court should require that the claimant exhaust adminis-
trative remedies-whether internal review by a plan administrator
or binding arbitration. The court should then accord the adminis-
trative result great deference in a subsequent ERISA suit. However,
if the dispute focuses on an alleged violation of one of ERISA's sub-
stantive standards of conduct, the court should generally dispense
with the exhaustion requirement and provide the claimant with un-
bridled access to de novo review of the claim.
7 According to the Secretary of Labor's regulations setting forth the minimum re-
quirements of internal claims review, grievance and arbitration procedures created by a
collective bargaining agreement and incorporated into the appeals process of a benefit
plan "will be deemed to comply" with those minimum standards. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-
1(b)(2)(i) (1985). The vast majority of collective bargaining agreements include an arbi-
tration clause. A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAw 518
(9th ed. 1981). Unlike internal claims procedures, arbitral procedures provide for final
review before a neutral third party.
8 See infra notes 9-27 and accompanying text.
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I
TRADITIONAL DEFERENCE TO LABOR ARBITRATION
ERISA's legislative history states that civil claims arise under9
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
(LMRA), 10 which provides access to federal courts to resolve labor
disputes but also endorses extrajudicial dispute resolution. Under
LMRA section 301(a), an individual may file suit in federal district
court for the "violation of contracts between an employer and a la-
bor organization."" LMRA section 203(d) establishes the congres-
sional policy favoring "[f]inal adjustment by a method agreed upon
by the parties"'12 as the preferred means of settling disputes over the
application or interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement.' 3
These two sections of the LMRA diverge, for one provides employ-
ees with access to federal courts while the other endorses extrajudi-
cial resolution of labor disputes.
The Supreme Court in 1960 resolved this tension in favor of
extrajudicial resolution in a trio of cases collectively known as the
Steelworkers Trilogy. 14 In United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing
Co. 15 and United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 16 the
steelworkers union sought to compel arbitration over disputes with
employers. Reasoning that the federal policy favoring arbitration
embodied in LMRA section 203(d) could best be effectuated by giv-
ing full play to the procedures set forth in the collective bargaining
agreement, 17 the Court compelled arbitration in both instances. 18
The Court fashioned a presumption of arbitrability, stating that any
ambiguity as to the scope of an arbitration clause in a collective bar-
gaining agreement should be resolved in favor of arbitration. 19 In
9 See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
10 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982).
11 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
12 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982).
13 See also The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
14 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
Courts have repeatedly endorsed the Steelworkers Trilogy. See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co.
v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of the United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 764-66
(1983); Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212, 224-25 (1983); Adams v.
Gould, Inc., 687 F.2d 27, 31 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1085 (1983).
See generally Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Arbitrability and Collective Bargaining, 28 U.
CHi. L. REv. 464 (1961).
15 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
16 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
17 American Mfg., 363 U.S. at 566.
18 Id. at 569; Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 585.
19 Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582-83 ("An order to arbitrate the particular griev-
ance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitra-
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United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 20 the Court scruti-
nized a post-grievance procedure challenge to the arbitral award,
holding that judicial review of the arbitrator's decision is strictly lim-
ited to determining whether the arbitrator exceeded his authority
under the collective bargaining agreement.21 The Court refused to
examine the merits of the arbitrator's decision.22
The Court further promoted arbitration in Republic Steel Corp. v.
Maddox,23 holding that an employee alleging a breach of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement between his union and employer must
first attempt to exhaust administrative remedies provided by the
agreement.2 4 The Court reasoned that the employee's dispute-
here over severance pay following the employee's termination-was
"of obvious concern to all employees, and a potential cause of dis-
pute so long as any employee maintains a continuing employment
relationship. ' 25 The Court compelled the employee to permit the
tion clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.
Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.").
20 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
21 Id. at 598.
22 The Court stated:
mhe question of interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is
a question for the arbitrator. It is the arbitrator's construction which was
bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator's decision concerns construc-
tion of the contract, the courts have no business overruling him because
their interpretation of the contract is different from his.
Id. at 599. The Court reasoned further that "[t]he federal policy of settling labor dis-
putes by arbitration would be undermined if courts had the final say on the merits of the
awards." Id. at 596. See Aaron,Judicial Intervention in Labor Arbitration, 20 STA. L. REV.
41 (1967) (endorsing judicial deference to merits of arbitrator's award); Dunau, Three
Problems in Labor Arbitration, 55 VA. L. REV. 427 (1969) (same).
The Steelworkers Court principally relied on two policy considerations to support its
endorsement of the arbitral process. First, the arbitrator, whom the parties themselves
select presumably because of their confidence in her judgment and knowledge of the
"law of the shop," is better able to weigh industrial realities than a judge, who might
lack such practical experience. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 578-82. Second, enforcing
the federal policy favoring private settlement of disputes avoids adversarial litigation
and enhances prospects for labor peace. Id. at 577-78. See also Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957) (LMRA "expresses a federal policy that federal
courts should enforce these agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations and
that industrial peace can be best obtained only in that way"). In addition, allowing the
arbitral decision to stand relieves already crowded federal courtrooms of an added bur-
den.
One commentator argues that the deference accorded arbitral awards arises be-
cause the arbitrator's interpretation of the contract is itself part of the contract the par-
ties seek to enforce. St. AntoineJudicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look
at Enterprise Wheel and its Progeny, 75 MIcH. L. REV. 1137, 1141-42 (1977) ("Courts will
ordinarily enforce an arbitral award because it is part of the parties' contract, and...
courts are in the business of enforcing contracts.").
23 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
24 Id. at 656-57. Under the agreement, arbitration provided the employee's sole
remedy. Id. at 657-59.
25 Id. at 656.
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union to pursue the established grievance procedure on his behalf
prior to bringing suit under the LMRA.26
Following Republic Steel, courts generally require exhaustion of
administrative grievance procedures set forth in a collective bar-
gaining agreement before entertaining suits over which they might
otherwise have jurisdiction. 27 By requiring exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies and according great deference to the results
reached in such proceedings, the Supreme Court breathed life into
the federal policy favoring arbitration. The Court thus resolved the
tension between LMRA section 301 (a) and the national labor policy
of promoting arbitration by embracing arbitration at the expense of
individual access to federal courts.
II
JUDICIAL EFFORTS TO RECONCILE ERISA wrrI
TRADITIONAL LABOR POLICY
Recent federal legislation has eroded the presumption of arbi-
trability and corresponding exhaustion requirement first articulated
in the Steelworkers Trilogy. Through employee protective legislation,
Congress has exerted increased control over the employer/
employee relationship and has granted employees substantive rights
independent of their employment agreements. 28 This trend has
26 Id. at 653. This requirement complements the union's status as the employee's
exclusive bargaining representative, providing the union with a means of enhancing its
prestige by handling the grievance expeditiously. Id. The employer benefits from the
limit on employee remedies which, in keeping with the Steelworkers Trilogy, are confined
to arbitration. Id. Finally, grievance procedures are ordinarily adequate to protect an
aggrieved employee's interests. Id.
27 Courts have discretion to assert jurisdiction over such suits, but as a matter of
federal labor policy they generally should not do so. NLRB v. Industrial Union of
Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 426 (1968); Buzzard v. Local Lodge
1040 Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 480 F.2d 35, 41 (9th Cir. 1973).
The exhaustion requirement enables administrative procedures to refine the issues and
sharpen the dispute, which may aid the court in a subsequent civil suit. Buzzard, 480
F.2d at 41. Exhaustion also conserves judicial resources. Id. at 41-42.
The Supreme Court has recognized some exceptions to the exhaustion require-
ment. First, when the conduct of the employer amounts to a repudiation of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, the employer is estopped from raising the unexhausted
arbitration procedures as a defense to the employee's cause of action. Drake Bakeries
Inc. v. Local 50, Am. Bakery & Confectionary Workers Int'l, 370 U.S. 254, 260-63
(1962). Second, an employee need not exhaust if he can prove that his union has
breached its duty of fair representation in wrongfully failing to assert his grievance.
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185-87 (1967). Finally, exhaustion is not required if it
"would be wholly futile." Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 393 U.S. 324, 330
(1969).
28 Examples of such legislation include title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982), the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-219 (1982), the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-
678 (1982), and ERISA.
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presented the courts with a dilemma: when should the federal labor
policy favoring administrative settlement of disputes give way to
court enforcement of federal statutory rights?29
These conflicting goals frequently clash in the context of ER-
ISA civil claims. In ERISA, Congress established standards for par-
ticipation and vesting,30 funding,31 fiduciary responsibility,3 2 and
reporting and disclosure,33 and enabled plan participants to enforce
those standards through civil actions in federal court.3 4 Specifically,
section 502(a)(1)(B) empowers plan participants to bring civil ac-
tions to recover benefits, enforce rights, or clarify rights to future
benefits under the terms of the plan.35 Participants may also bring
suit in federal court pursuant to section 502(a) (3) for breach of fidu-
ciary duty or violations of ERISA's statutory standards.3 6
Congress envisioned that civil actions would provide the pri-
mary means of enforcing ERISA's protections.3 7 This policy under-
mines the long-established federal labor policy favoring arbitration
and exhaustion of grievance procedures. Attempting to reconcile
these policies, courts have generally agreed that claimants bringing
plan-based actions under section 502 (a) (1)(B) must exhaust admin-
istrative procedures and the administrative result should be ac-
corded great deference.38 Courts have disagreed, however, over
29 Increasingly, the policy favoring arbitral settlement of disputes has given way to
the courts' desire to enforce the policy embodied in federal legislation. See Castle &
Lansing, Arbitration of Labor Grievances Brought Under Contractual and Statutory Provisions:
The Supreme Court Grows Less Deferential to the Arbitration Process, 21 AM. Bus. L.J. 49 (1983).
Overlaps between contractual remedies provided by the collective bargaining
agreement and those provided by federal law create special problems for arbitrators.
The arbitrator must decide which should control-the contract or the statute. See
KadenJudges and Arbitrators: Observations on the Scope ofJudicial Review, 80 COLUM. L. REV.
267, 289 (1980) (arguing that "[a]bsent the rare case of manifest illegality.... the arbi-
trator should apply the contract. . . and leave it to the courts to import the require-
ments of law"); see also Meltzer, supra note 14.
For a discussion of the problems ERISA presents for arbitrators, see Murphy, The
Impact of ERISA on Arbitration, 32 ARB. J. 123, 125-28 (1977).
30 ERISA §§ 201-211, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061 (1982).
31 Id. §§ 301-306, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086 (1982).
32 Id. §§ 401-414, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1982).
33 Id. §§ 101-111, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1982).
34 Id. §§ 501-514, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1144 (1982).
35 See supra note 4.
36 See supra note 5.
37 See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
38 For the purposes of this Note, "administrative procedures" include both in-
trafund claim review procedures required by ERISA and collectively bargained griev-
ance procedures, usually culminating in binding arbitration. See supra notes 6-7 and
accompanying text. The nature of the judicial deference accorded an administrative re-
sult may vary depending on the type of administrative procedure that produced it. A
court defers to a plan fiduciary's decision after intrafund administrative review by em-
ploying a low standard to review the decision. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
Alternatively, a court may defer to an arbitral result by granting it preclusive effect. See
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whether the exhaustion requirement should apply to statute-based
actions brought under section 502(a)(3), and, if an administrative
resolution is reached in such a claim, how much deference it should
be accorded.
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Procedures
Courts uniformly hold that the failure of a participant to ex-
haust internal review procedures when challenging a benefit denial
under the terms of a benefit plan will bar his subsequent suit under
ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B). 39 Courts disagree, however, as to
whether a plaintiff must exhaust administrative procedures where he
alleges a violation of one of ERISA's substantive standards under
section 502(a) (3).
In Kross v. Western Electric Co.,40 for example, the district court
imposed an exhaustion requirement on a plaintiff alleging violations
of substantive rights granted by ERISA. Western Electric dis-
charged the plaintiff during a substantial reduction in its work force.
Had the plaintiff remained with the company two more years he
would have accrued additional pension benefits.4 1 Five years after
his discharge, the plaintiff filed a class action under section
502(a) (3), alleging that Western Electric violated section 510.42 The
infra note 58 and accompanying text. This Note refers to both types of judicial treat-
ment of administrative results as "deference."
39 See, e.g., Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1980) (where pension plan
created by collective bargaining agreement provided appeals procedures for benefit de-
nials, employee must exhaust those procedures prior to bringing suit under ERISA);
Worsowicz v. Nashua Corp., 612 F. Supp. 310 (D.N.H. 1985) (action by widow of em-
ployee seeking life insurance and retirement benefits dismissed; access to federal courts
under ERISA predicated on exhaustion of internal remedies); Ridens v. Voluntary Sepa-
ration Program, 610 F. Supp. 770 (D. Minn. 1985) (failure to exhaust intrafund remedies
barred action to challenge severance benefit denial); Tomczyscyn v. Teamsters, Local
115 Health & Welfare Fund, 590 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (claim by decedent's
beneficiaries challenging denial of death benefits dismissed because of claimants' failure
to exhaust intrafund appeals procedures; futility exception to exhaustion requirement
narrowly construed); Scheider v. United States Steel Corp., 486 F. Supp. 211 (W.D. Pa.
1980) (failure to exhaust intrafund remedies barred employee's suit contesting denial of
pension benefits); Sample v. Monsanto Co., 485 F. Supp. 1018 (E.D. Mo. 1980) (where
disability benefit plan's appeals procedure called for binding arbitration before medical
board, employee's action dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedy); Taylor
v. Bakery & Confectionary Union & Indus. Int'l Welfare Fund, 455 F. Supp. 816
(E.D.N.C. 1978) (intrafund appeals procedure set forth in collective bargaining agree-
ment; ERISA suit challenging denial of benefits under pension plan predicated on ex-
haustion of this procedure).
40 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1983).
41 Id. at 1239.
42 ERISA § 510 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, dis-
cipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising
any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee
benefit plan.., or for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of
958 [Vol. 71:952
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district court dismissed the claim, holding that the plaintiff's failure
to exhaust the internal review procedures set forth in the pension
plan precluded his subsequent suit.43
On appeal, Kross argued that the court should refrain from ap-
plying an exhaustion requirement where ERISA's substantive guar-
antees, rather than the pension plan's provisions, provided the basis
for the claim.44 The court noted that ERISA fails to indicate
whether exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite to
an action, concluding that policy considerations demand that courts
ordinarily require exhaustion.45 The court reasoned that an exhaus-
tion requirement provides a nonadversarial forum for claims settle-
ment, minimizes costs, and enables plan administrators to carry out
their duties under ERISA.46 Numerous courts have adopted the
Kross approach, requiring ERISA claimants to exhaust internal pen-
sion plan procedures prior to gaining access to federal courts, even
where the plaintiff alleges that his employer violated a specific ER-
ISA standard.47
any right to which such participant may become entitled under [an em-
ployee benefit] plan ....
29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982). The plaintiff alleged that Western Electric terminated him in
order to avoid paying him benefits. 701 F.2d at 1239.
43 Id. at 1239.
44 Id. at 1241.
45 Id. at 1244-45. The court acknowledged that under extraordinary circumstances,
the district court should be free to exercise its discretion by granting a federal forum
prior to exhaustion. Id.
46 Id. These policies are more fully explored at infra notes 85-95 and accompanying
text.
Other courts have criticized Kross for failing to distinguish between claims alleging
violations of ERISA's substantive standards and claims focusing on proper interpreta-
tion of a pension plan. See, e.g., Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747, 752 (9th
Cir. 1984) ("[W]e find Kross to be based on a flawed premise, and we refuse to follow
it."); Grywczynski v. Shasta Beverages, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 61, 64 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (same);
McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1492, 1504 (D.N.J. 1985) (same).
47 In Delisi v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 580 F. Supp. 1572 (W.D. Pa. 1984), a fed-
eral district court dismissed an employee's action charging that his termination was
designed to deprive him of pensions rights. The plaintiff, a union member and long-
time employee of UPS, suffered from a mental condition allegedly arising out of an inci-
dent in which a co-worker and close friend died in an explosion while unknowingly de-
livering a package containing a bomb. The plaintiff was institutionalized for his illness
on several occasions. During his last hospital stay, he applied for a disability pension
provided by a collective bargaining agreement between UPS and his union. In response,
UPS fired him, allegedly for insubordination. The plaintiff submitted a grievance pro-
testing his discharge, only to be rebuffed by UPS. Id. at 1574. Rather than exhausting
the grievance procedures provided by the collective bargaining agreement, the plaintiff
filed suit alleging that UPS fired him in violation of ERISA § 510, see supra note 42. The
court held that the plaintiff's remedies under the collective bargaining agreement
barred his action. 580 F. Supp. at 1575. See also, e.g., Mason v. Continental Group, Inc.,
763 F.2d 1219 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (employees' ERISA suit alleging that plant shutdown
was partly motivated by desire to prevent vesting of pension rights barred because of
employees' failure to exhaust arbitration procedures provided by collective bargaining
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Other courts have declined to require exhaustion where the
claimant charges that the defendant violated one of ERISA's statu-
tory standards of conduct. For example, in McLendon v. Continental
Group, Inc.,48 a district court explicitly rejected Kross,49 holding that
former employees need not exhaust grievance procedures provided
by a collective bargaining agreement prior to bringing suit in federal
court charging their employer with discrimination based on pension
status. The plaintiffs filed a class action alleging that Continental
discharged employees in order to reduce pension costs, in violation
of section 510.50 Continental moved to dismiss the ERISA counts,
arguing that the claimants must exhaust grievance procedures (in-
cluding arbitration) as a prerequisite to seeking a judicial forum.
The court denied the motion, reasoning that the question before the
court was not the plaintiffs' eligibility under the plan, because indis-
putably the plaintiffs did not qualify for the pension. Rather, the
issue was whether Continental had discriminated on the basis of
pension status in violation of section 510.51 The court further rea-
soned that section 510 rights, including the right to file suit in fed-
eral court, could not be prospectively waived via an agreement to
arbitrate. Therefore, the court did not require the claimants to ex-
haust their arbitral remedy before bringing an action under section
502(a)(3)P 2
Several courts have also held that a plaintiff alleging a violation
of one of ERISA's substantive standards of conduct may maintain an
action in federal court despite a prior agreement to submit employ-
agreement), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 863 (1986); Viggiano v. Shenango China Div. of
Anchor Hocking Corp., 750 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1984) (dispute between union and em-
ployer over content of collective bargaining agreement containing employee benefit
plan subject to agreement's arbitration clause; ERISA claim dismissed pending arbitra-
tor's interpretation of agreement's meaning); Challenger v. Local 1, Int'l Bridge, Struc-
tural, & Ornamental Ironworkers, 619 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1980) (suit alleging improper
denial of benefits under collectively bargained pension plan dismissed for failure to ex-
haust arbitral remedy); Chambers v. European Am. Bank & Trust Co., 601 F. Supp. 630,
640 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (former employee's cause of action based upon employer's failure
to meet ERISA's notice requirements barred for failure to exhaust intrafund proce-
dures); Brown v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 589 F. Supp. 64 (S.D. Ga. 1984) (action alleg-
ing denial of benefits constituting breach of fiduciary duty subject to requirement that
intrafund procedures-as distinct from arbitration agreement in collective bargaining
agreement-be exhausted). Although these cases require exhaustion of collective bar-
gaining agreement grievance procedures, they do not discuss the degree of deference
courts should accord the administrative result.
48 602 F. Supp. 1492 (D.N.J. 1985).
49 Id. at 1504.
50 Id. at 1497. For the text of § 510, see supra note 42. Continental pleaded eco-
nomic necessity, conceding that although pension costs were considered in making its
business decisions, they were only one of many factors. 602 F. Supp. at 1498.
51 Id. at 1503-04.
52 Id. at 1504-05.
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ment disputes to binding arbitration.53 Similarly, other courts have
ruled that a plaintiff alleging ERISA violations need not exhaust in-
ternal procedures set forth in the pension plan prior to seeking ac-
cess to federal court under section 502(a)(3).54
As this discussion demonstrates, courts are divided as to the
propriety of requiring exhaustion in civil suits under section
502(a) (3). Some courts have required that ERISA plaintiffs exhaust
administrative remedies-whether arbitration pursuant to a collec-
tive bargaining agreement or intrafund review procedures set out in
the plan-prior to seeking relief in federal court.5 5 Other courts
have chosen to entertain jurisdiction even though the claimant has
failed to exhaust administrative remedies.5 6
B. Deference to Administrative Results
The above cases focused on whether courts in section 502 ac-
tions should require exhaustion of administrative dispute resolution
procedures. A related question remains: to what degree should
courts defer to the administrative results? Courts generally apply a
deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review when scru-
tinizing benefit denials following exhaustion of intrafund proce-
dures, and, as a result, typically uphold the plan administrators'
53 See, e.g., Barrowdough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 752 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1985)
(despite contractual agreement to arbitrate disputes arising out of employment, plaintiff
need not arbitrate count alleging refusal to provide an accounting in violation of ER-
ISA); Lindahl v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 609 F. Supp. 267 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (employee
alleging breach of fiduciary duty need not exhaust arbitral remedy created by collective
bargaining agreement prior to bringing suit; statutory and contractual claims represent
independent remedies); Brown v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 589 F. Supp. 64 (S.D. Ga.
1984) (following plant closure and denial of benefits, action alleging breach of fiduciary
duty need not be arbitrated pursuant to collective bargaining agreement; imposition of
such requirement would result in "double exhaustion").
54 For example, in Garry v. TRW, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 157 (N.D. Ohio 1985), the
court held that the plaintiff's failure to exhaust intrafund procedures did not bar his
subsequent suit alleging that his employer violated ERISA § 510 by terminating him in
order to prevent the accrual of pension rights. The plaintiff had worked for TRW for 17
years, and alleged that TRW followed the practice of replacing older employees with
newer ones in order to reduce pension costs. The court explicitly rejected the reasoning
of the Kross decision. Id. at 164. See also, e.g., Janowski v. International Bhd. of Team-
sters Local No. 710 Pension Fund, 673 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1982) (class action on behalf
of plan participants to determine whether plan conforms to ERISA's provisions not sub-
ject to exhaustion requirement; issue solely one of statutory interpretation without need
for factual record), vacated, 463 U.S. 1222 (1983); Grywczynski v. Shasta Beverages, Inc.,
606 F. Supp. 61 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (former workers charging employer with nationwide
purge of longstanding employees in order to reduce pension costs need not exhaust
intrafund procedures); Clouatre v. Lockwood, 593 F. Supp. 1136 (M.D. La. 1984)
(claimant charging employer violated ERISA's notice requirements need not exhaust
internal remedies; exhaustion requirement discretionary and inappropriate where dis-
pute is solely one of law).
55 See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
56 See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
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decisions. 57 Similarly, several courts have held that an arbitral
award resolving a plan-based dispute precludes subsequent judicial
review of the claim's merits. 58 In effect, these courts treat the arbi-
tral decision as res judicata in a subsequent section 502(a)(1)(B)
suit.59 However, when a plaintiff's claim alleges a violation of ER-
ISA's substantive standards, courts disagree on the proper balance
between the conflicting federal policies of deferring to administra-
tive dispute resolution and providing a judicial forum for statutory
claims.
Electing to defer to administrative results, the court in King v.
James River-Pepperell, Inc. 60 ruled that a settlement reached between
the plaintiff's union and employer barred his subsequent section
502(a)(3) suit alleging a violation of ERISA's substantive standards
of conduct. The plaintiff, a long-time employee, became totally and
permanently disabled as the result of an industrial accident. Upon
learning of the extent of the plaintiff's injuries, management termi-
nated him. The plaintiff's union filed a grievance on his behalf,
reaching a settlement shortly thereafter.61 Several years later, the
plaintiff filed suit, alleging that his pension rights would have vested
had he remained employed for another four months. 62 Reasoning
that a decision rendered by an arbitrator is res judicata as to subse-
quent suits under ERISA, the court held that the plaintiff compro-
mised his claim by accepting the settlement. The court concluded,
"To allow plaintiff ... to see[k] identical relief in this Court would
defeat ERISA's goal of achieving final resolution of employee griev-
57 See generally Note,Judicial Review of Fiduciary Claim Denials Under ERISA: An Alterna-
tive to the Arbitrary and Capricious Test, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 986 (1986) (presenting cases
that apply arbitrary and capricious test and arguing that this test is too deferential). An
analysis of the propriety of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review is beyond the
scope of this Note.
58 See, e.g., Delaney v. Union Carbide Corp., 749 F.2d 17 (8th Cir. 1984) (em-
ployee's application for permanent disability benefits denied by medical arbitration
board; arbitration agreement contained in benefit plan and collective bargaining agree-
ment deemed valid, enforceable and binding); Mahan v. Reynolds Metals Co., 569 F.
Supp. 482 (E.D. Ark. 1983) (employee bound by medical arbitration board's finding that
he was not permanently disabled and was therefore not entitled to benefits under plan;
arbitral result res judicata as to issue of disability), aff'd on other grounds, 739 F.2d 388
(8th Cir. 1984); Wilson v. Fischer & Porter Co. Pension Plan, 551 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. Pa.
1982) (arbitrator's finding that plan's denial of benefits was proper barred subsequent
suit by union member alleging that plan administrators breached fiduciary duty).
59 Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of the merits precludes the
relitigation of claims which were or could have been raised in that action. Nevada v.
United States, 463 U.S. 110, 130 (1983).
60 592 F. Supp. 54 (D. Mass. 1984).
61 Under the terms of the settlement, James River reimbursed the plaintiff for a
portion of his medical expenses and permitted him to "convert certain medical insur-
ance." Id. at 55.
62 The plaintiff alleged that James River violated ERISA § 510. Id. See supra note
42.
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ances at the administrative level and would increase unjustifiably the
costs of settling the claim." 63
Other courts reject the approach exemplified by the King case
and do not defer to prior administrative results in section 502(a)(3)
suits. For example, the Ninth Circuit in Amaro v. Continental Can
Co. 64 held that a binding arbitral decision was not res judicata in a
subsequent suit alleging a violation of section 510. The plaintiffs
were former Continental employees laid off from one of the firm's
plants. The employees' union filed a grievance charging that the lay-
offs violated the collective bargaining agreement between the union
and Continental. The union pursued the claim through binding ar-
bitration, the final step in the grievance procedures set forth in the
collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator denied the griev-
ance, deciding that changing market conditions justified Continen-
tal's conduct.65 The plaintiffs subsequently filed suit in federal
district court, alleging that Continental laid them off to prevent their
qualification for pension rights. 66 The district court dismissed the
suit67 and the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that ERISA created
employee rights wholly independent of collectively bargained rights
even though the grievance and subsequent lawsuit were based upon
identical facts.68 The court stated, "To hold otherwise would en-
danger the protection afforded employees by Congress' enactment
of ERISA, ' ' 69 and remanded the case, instructing the district court
to consider the statutory claims de novo02' Thus, rather than defer
to the administrative outcome, the court simply ignored it.
As the above discussion demonstrates, courts have recognized
the tension between the labor law presumption favoring administra-
tive dispute resolution and the substantive protections ERISA pro-
vides plan participants. The courts have reached widely divergent
conclusions when balancing these competing policies. These incon-
sistent results undermine Congress's goal of uniformity in the law
governing employee benefits plans71 and render uncertain the
63 592 F. Supp. at 56.
64 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1984).
65 Id. at 748.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 749.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 750. The court feared that if the arbitrator's decision could preclude a
subsequent suit in federal court, "[a]n ERISA claim could be defeated without the bene-
fit of the protections inherent in the judicial process." Id.
70 Id. at 753. The court further held that the arbitral result could be admitted as
evidence bearing upon factual matters in the trial. Id. (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Den-
ver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 n.21 (1974) (post-arbitration suit under title VII)). See infra note
146 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the court emphasized that the claim must be
considered de novo. 724 F.2d at 753.
71 See infra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
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rights of plan participants and the duties of those who administer
them.72
III
RECONCILING THE INCONSISTENT AIMS OF LABOR POLICY
AND ERISA
The inconsistent results reached by the federal courts are not
surprising, for Congress provided little guidance: ERISA itself men-
tions neither exhaustion nor arbitration. Nevertheless, ERISA's leg-
islative history and underlying aims do provide a reasoned basis for
deciding, first, whether courts should require claimants to exhaust
administrative procedures set forth in either the plan or a collective
bargaining agreement before bringing suit under ERISA, and sec-
ond, what force courts should give results achieved through such
administrative means.
ERISA's explicit preemption of state law in the employee bene-
fits area 73 suggests that Congress intended federal courts to fashion
a doctrine of exhaustion and deference to administrative outcomes
that promotes the statute's underlying aims. Moreover, the late
Senator Javits, a principal sponsor of the Act, recognized the need
for courts to develop federal common law in order to fill the gaps
created when Congress exercised its preemptive power over the
field, stating, "[i]t is... intended that a body of Federal substantive
law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues involving
rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans. '" 74
72 Supreme CourtJustice White recently noted the unsettled state of the law in this
area. Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 863 (1986) (White, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari). He urged the Court to grant certiorari "in order to resolve
the uncertainty over the existence of an exhaustion requirement in cases of this kind."
Id. at 864. In light of the growing volume and significance of ERISA litigation, he con-
tinued, "the need for clear procedural rules governing access to the federal courts is
imperative.... Accordingly, the conflict among the circuits over the issue of an exhaus-
tion requirement under ERISA can hardly be passed over as an unimportant one unwor-
thy of this Court's attention." Id.
73 ERISA § 514(a)provides:
[The provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter
shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereaf-
ter relate to any employee benefit plan ....
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982). Citing "the emergence of a comprehensive and pervasive
Federal interest and the interests of uniformity with respect to interstate plans," Con-
gress displaced state law in the field of employee benefit programs. 120 CONG. REC.
29,942 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits). Congressman Dent termed the preemption of
state law the "crowning achievement" of ERISA. 120 CONG. REc. 29,197 (1974). See
generally Kilberg & Inman, Preemption of State Laws Relating to Employee Benefit Plans: An
Analysis of ERISA Section 514, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1313 (1984).
74 120 CONG. REc. 29,942 (1974).
Senator Williams, also a principal sponsor of the bill, stated that ERISA "intended
to preempt [state law] for Federal regulation." 120 CONG. REc. 29,933 (1974). See
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Courts have interpreted these remarks as an invitation to impose an
exhaustion requirement and to defer to administrative results when
ERISA's purposes will be served. 75
Courts can best promote ERISA's aims by focusing on the un-
derlying source of the complaint. If the claim involves a factual dis-
pute relating to a beneficiary's eligibility or the proper
interpretation of benefit plan terms (a section 502(a)(1) (B) claim),
then the court should usually require that claimants exhaust admin-
istrative procedures. Furthermore, the court should accord an arbi-
tral result in such a case the deference traditionally granted arbitral
awards in labor law. 76 However, if the claim alleges violations of ER-
ISA's substantive standards of conduct, a court should require ex-
haustion only when it does not unfairly prejudice the plaintiff's
claim. Furthermore, should a participant unsuccessfully exhaust ar-
bitral or intrafund remedies and later bring a section 502(a)(3) ac-
tion alleging substantive violations of ERISA, the administrative
outcome should not affect the plaintiff's right to de novo review of
the claim in federal courts.
A. Claims for Benefits Under the Terms of a Plan-Section
502(a) (1) (B) Actions
ERISA provides those denied pension plan benefits with access
to federal courts. Section 502(a)(1)(B) empowers employee benefit
plan participants to bring civil actions to recover benefits, enforce
rights, or clarify rights to future benefits under the terms of the
plan.77 Such actions typically focus on proper interpretation of plan
provisions 78 or factual issues on which eligibility for plan benefits
depends. 79
ERISA's legislative history demonstrates that Congress in-
Authier v. Ginsberg, 757 F.2d 796, 799 n.5 (6th Cir.) ("preemption provision was in-
tended to create a body of federal substantive law regulating pension plans"), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 208 (1985).
75 See Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 1980); Taylor v. Bakery &
Confectionary Union & Indus. Int'l Welfare Fund, 455 F. Supp. 816, 818-19 (E.D.N.C.
1978).
76 In other words, courts should not review the merits of the arbitrator's decision.
See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the proper degree of
deference to benefit denials under a plan's terms after exhaustion of intrafund review
procedures, see Note, supra note 57.
77 For the text of § 502(a)(1)(B), see supra note 4.
78 See, e.g., Viggiano v. Shenango China Div. of Anchor Hocking Corp., 750 F.2d
276, 277 (3d Cir. 1984) (employer's duty to pay health insurance premiums of striking
employees); Wilson v. Fischer & Porter Co. Pension Plan, 551 F. Supp. 593, 594 (E.D.
Pa. 1982) (method of calculating pension benefits).
79 See, e.g., Mahan v. Reynolds Metals Co., 569 F. Supp. 482 (E.D. Ark. 1983) (medi-
cal arbitration board's finding that plaintiff could perform bargaining unit work), aff'd on
other grounds, 739 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1984).
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tended to subordinate the right of plan participants to bring a sec-
tion 502(a)(1)(B) action to the traditional federal policy favoring
administrative resolution of labor disputes. The conference report
on the Act provides that these actions "are to be regarded as arising
under the laws of the United States in similar fashion to those
brought under section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act
of 1947."' 0 Commentators have unanimously construed this por-
tion of the conference report as demonstrating Congress's intent
that the judicial treatment of LMRA section 301 suits applies to ac-
tions brought under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B). 81 Exhaustion of
administrative remedies8 2 and judicial deference to the resulting de-
cision 83 have long been the rule in section 301 actions. The confer-
ence report ties these LMRA section 301 practices to actions under
ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B). In addition, ERISA section 514(d) pro-
vides that ERISA does not supersede other federal law.84 Existing
federal law, most notably the LMRA, establishes the policy of great
judicial deference to administrative resolution of disputes in the
field of labor law. Section 514(d) suggests that ERISA suits are sub-
ject to that longstanding policy. Therefore, courts should ordinarily
require exhaustion of administrative procedures and defer to their
outcome whether the procedures consist of intrafund review of plan
administrators' decisions or formal grievance proceedings leading
to binding arbitration.
80 H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 327 (conference report), reprinted in
1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5038, 5107.
81 See, e.g., Donaldson, The Use of Arbitration to Avoid Litigation under ERISA, 17 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 215, 216-27 (1975); Schneider, Surviving ERISA Preemption: Pension Arbi-
tration in the 1980s, 16 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 269, 279 (1980).
Rather than implying that all gaps in the provisions allowing for civil suits for bene-
fits claims were to be filled "in similar fashion" to the gaps in § 301, this passage could
be construed merely as an acknowledgment that, like the LMRA, ERISA preempts state
law. ERISA § 514(a) bolsters this reading of the report, for it provides that ERISA su-
persedes all state law that relates to employee benefit plans. See supra notes 73-74 and
accompanying text. Under this view, ERISA simply wipes clean the slate of state pension
regulation, leaving federal courts free to fashion a new body of federal common law to
deal with such issues as exhaustion. Thus, when deciding whether to impose an exhaus-
tion requirement, the courts may consider the underlying policies of ERISA without
regard to the judicial baggage of LMRA § 301. One commentator alluded to such a
construction of the conference report in a discussion of an ERISA plaintiff's right to trial
by jury. Note, The Right to Jury Trial in Enforcement Actions Under Section 502(a)(1)(B) of
ERISA, 96 HAiv. L. REv. 737, 742 (1983). However, no court has endorsed or even
considered this view in the context of exhaustion.
82 See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
83 See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
84 ERISA § 514(d) provides that "[n]othing in this subchapter shall be construed to
alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United States ... or
any rule or regulation issued under any such law." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1982).
966 [Vol. 71:952
1986] ERISA: ARBITRAL/INTRAFUND REMEDIES 967
1. Intrafund Procedures
In addition to the link Congress forged between benefit claim
suits under ERISA section 502 (a) (1)(B) and suits under LMRA sec-
tion 301, ERISA's statutory scheme provides evidence that Con-
gress specifically intended that claimants exhaust internal
procedures prior to bringing an action under ERISA. The same evi-
dence supports a judicial policy of deference to the results of these
intrafund procedures.
a. Exhaustion. ERISA section 503 requires that all employee
benefit plans establish a benefit claims procedure.8 5 Courts have
noted that by imposing such claims resolution procedures Congress
hoped to reduce the number of frivolous lawsuits under ERISA,
promote consistent treatment of benefit claims, provide a nonadver-
sarial forum to settle such claims, and minimize settlement costs. 86
Filtering all benefit claims through the intrafund review process fur-
thers these goals. It also reduces the number of lawsuits challeng-
ing denials of plan benefits, easing the burden on already crowded
courts.8 7 Requiring exhaustion of intrafund review procedures en-
sures that the benefits Congress envisioned will accrue. As one
court remarked, "It would certainly be anomalous if the same good
reasons that presumably led Congress and the Secretary to require
covered plans to provide administrative remedies for aggrieved
claimants did not lead the courts to see that those remedies are reg-
ularly used."88
85 ERISA § 503 provides:
In accordance with regulations of the Secretary, every employee ben-
efit plan shall-
(1) provide adequate notice in writing to any participant or benefici-
ary whose claim for benefits under the plan has been denied, setting forth
the specific reasons for such denial, written in a manner calculated to be
understood by the participant, and
(2) afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant whose claim
for benefits has been denied for a full and fair review by the appropriate
named fiduciary of the decision denying the claim.
29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1982).
Pursuant to ERISA § 505, 29 U.S.C. § 1135 (1982), the Secretary of Labor has
promulgated regulations establishing minimum requirements for benefit plan claims
procedures. These regulations set forth the standards with which such procedures must
comply. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (1985). See infra note 122.
86 See, e.g., Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 1980); Taylor v. Bakery &
Confectionary Union & Indus. Int'l Welfare Fund, 455 F. Supp. 816, 819-20 (E.D.N.C.
1978).
87 See Chambers v. European Am. Bank & Trust Co., 601 F. Supp. 630, 640
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) ("Congress's intent . .. was not to burden the courts with managing
these programs").
88 Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 1980).
Senator Williams, a principal sponsor of ERISA, stated that "prior to bringing an
action to recover benefits from the plan, the participant or beneficiary would have the
right to receive written notice from the plan of the special reasons his claim for benefits
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Exhaustion of intrafund remedies also furthers the congres-
sional mandate that administrators assume responsibility for the
management of plans covered by ERISA, a goal illustrated by ER-
ISA's imposition of broad fiduciary obligations on plan trustees. 89
By requiring exhaustion, courts enhance the administrators' ability
to manage their funds efficiently by preventing premature judicial
intervention into the claims-settlement process. 90 Exhaustion also
enhances efficiency by serving to sharpen the dispute and develop a
factual record should judicial review ultimately be required.91
Finally, requiring exhaustion of internal claims procedures
serves the congressional aim of encouraging employers to offer em-
ployee benefit plans because by reducing litigation costs it reduces
the expense of plan administration. In Taylor v. Bakery & Confection-
ary Union & Industry International Welfare Fund, 92 the court reasoned
that "[t]ied to these int[ra]fund claims procedures was Congress'
awareness of the potential costs of pension reform, and it sought to
'strike a balance between providing meaningful reform and keeping
costs within reasonable limits.' -93 Noting Congress's desire to fos-
ter development of employee benefit plans, 94 the court continued:
If claimants were allowed to litigate the validity of their claims
before a final trustee decision was rendered, the costs of dispute
settlement would increase markedly for employers. Employees
would also suffer financially because, rather than utilize a simple
procedure which allows them to deal directly with their employer,
they would have to employ an attorney and bear the costs of ad-
versary litigation in the courts. 95
Together, these elements of ERISA's legislative history and
statutory goals-the invocation of LMRA section 301, the preserva-
tion of existing federal law, the requirement that all benefit plans
adopt claims procedures, the imposition of fiduciary obligations,
was denied; and, in addition, would be entitled to a full and fair review by the plan adminis-
trator of the decision to deny such benefits." 120 CONG. REC. 29,933 (1974) (emphasis
added). To state that a claimant is entitled to "full and fair review" is not to say that such
administrative review must be obtained prior to gaining access to federal courts. This
language suggests that Congress did not intend that exhaustion be required, but rather
that the claimant is free to choose either remedy. However, the great bulk of contrary
legislative evidence outweighs this isolated comment.
89 See ERISA §§ 402-412, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1102-1112 (1982).
90 See Challenger v. Local 1, Int'l Bridge, Structural, & Ornamental Ironworkers,
619 F.2d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 1980) (making every claim dispute into federal lawsuit would
place economic burden on plans).
91 Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 568 (9th Cir. 1980).
92 455 F. Supp. 816 (E.D.N.C. 1978).
93 Id. at 820 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4670, 4682).
94 455 F. Supp. at 820.
95 Id.
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and the congressional desire to encourage the proliferation of em-
ployee benefit plans by reducing the costs of claims settlement-
suggest that Congress intended that claimants exhaust internal ap-
peals procedures prior to seeking judicial review of a benefit denial
under section 502(a)(1)(B). Nonetheless, traditional exceptions to
the exhaustion requirement should still apply.96 For example, if the
claimant can demonstrate that exhaustion would cause irreparable
harm or be futile, or that he has attempted to exhaust private reme-
dies but has been denied meaningful access to the review process,
courts should not require exhaustion. 97
b. Deference. The same arguments that suggest claimants seek-
ingjudicial review under section 502(a)(1)(B) must exhaust internal
claims procedures also support a policy of judicial deference to the
outcome of such procedures. Granting de novo review of benefit
claim denials would sap the administrative process of much of its
value. Obligatory exhaustion of internal claims procedures would
become a largely useless and costly step.98 On the other hand,
treating the results of such procedures as res judicata in a subse-
quent suit would deprive claimants of the judicial review that section
502(a)(1)(B) clearly contemplates. Recognizing this, most courts
have adopted an intermediate yet deferential "arbitrary and capri-
cious" standard for review of the results of internal claims proce-
dures.99 Generally, courts should decline to disturb the results of
such procedures in subsequent ERISA suits under section
502(a)(1)(B).
2. Arbitration
ERISA's treatment of the appropriate relationship between ar-
96 See supra note 27.
97 See Tomczyscyn v. Teamsters, Local 115 Health & Welfare Fund, 590 F. Supp.
211, 213 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (noting that courts recognize few exceptions due to "strong
policies supporting exhaustion"); Lieske v. Morlock, 570 F. Supp. 1426, 1429-30 (N.D.
I1. 1983) (former employees denied distributions from benefit plan need not exhaust
internal remedies in action alleging breach of fiduciary duty where plan administrators'
conduct indicates further proceedings would be futile); Lucas v. Warner & Swasey Co.,
475 F. Supp. 1071, 1074 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (recognizing but declining application of ex-
ceptions to exhaustion requirement).
Under regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor, if a plan fails to respond
to a claimant's request for review of a benefit denial within 60 days (120 days with an
extension), the request is deemed denied and the claimant may bring a civil action on
the merits. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(h)(1)(i) (1985).
98 See Mahan v. Reynolds Metals Co., 569 F. Supp. 482, 487 (E.D. Ark. 1983) (re-
jecting de novo review because it "would defeat any purpose to be served by the admin-
istrative procedures set out under the pension plan"), aff'd on other grounds, 739 F.2d 388
(8th Cir. 1984).
99 For an argument that the arbitrary and capricious standard of review accords too
much deference to fiduciaries, see Note, supra note 57. In any event, the outcome of
intrafund review procedures is due a degree of respect.
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bitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement and section
502(a)(1)(B) suits for benefits under a plan's terms is less clear.
Although the conference report on the Act suggests that the tradi-
tional presumption of arbitrability applies, 100 elements of the statu-
tory scheme pertaining to the creation of internal claims
procedures 0 1 and fiduciary responsibilities 102 bear on the role of
intrafund grievance procedures only; they provide little guidance as
to the proper role of arbitration. Nevertheless, arbitration is well
suited to resolve disputes over eligibility for benefits under a plan's
terms. Moreover, in the collective bargaining process the claimant
presumably agreed to submit disputes over the plan's terms and
benefit eligibility under those terms to binding arbitration. There-
fore, courts should require that the claimant exhaust the arbitral
remedy and grant the resulting award the deference traditionally ac-
corded arbitral outcomes.
a. Exhaustion. The scant relevant legislative history suggests
that courts should require that claimants seeking judicial review of a
benefit denial under section 502(a) (1) (B) first exhaust arbitral reme-
dies. An earlier version of ERISA passed by the Senate permitted a
civil action challenging a benefit claim denial "in lieu of submitting
the dispute to arbitration under the plan."'103 Under this version,
arbitration was an optional remedy, and a claimant could choose be-
tween bringing suit and arbitrating the dispute. This provision's
omission from the final bill suggests that Congress intended either
to dispense with arbitration altogether or to adopt it as an exclusive
remedy. Given the deference historically paid arbitration and the
specific invocation of LMRA section 301,104 Congress probably in-
tended the latter.
More important, courts should impose exhaustion on section
502 (a)(1) (B) claimants subject to arbitration under a collective bar-
gaining agreement because such claimants have already agreed to
abide by the arbitrator's interpretation of the employment contract.
Benefit plans under a collective bargaining agreement are part of
the contract-the very contract that sets forth the agreement to arbi-
trate. In a section 502(a) (1) (B) suit, the claimant seeks judicial re-
100 See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
101 See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text. Regulations promulgated by the
Secretary of Labor acknowledge that arbitration under a collective bargaining agree-
ment satisfies the requirement that all benefit plans contain intrafund claims procedures.
29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(b)(2)(i) (1985). See supra note 7.
102 See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
103 H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 691(b) (1974), reprinted in 3 SUBCOMM. ON LABOR
OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLA-
TIVE HIsTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACr OF 1974, at 3814
(1976).
104 See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
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view of the facts of the dispute and the meaning of the benefit plan
terms contained in the collective bargaining agreement.10 5 The par-
ties, however, have already agreed to accept the arbitrator's inter-
pretation of the agreement. 106 Courts should require that section
502(a) (1)(B) claimants exhaust arbitration because that is precisely
the remedy bargained for.' 07
b. Deference. The nature of section 502(a)(1)(B) claims sug-
gests that courts should treat a prior arbitral decision as res judicata
in a subsequent ERISA suit. Such claims focus on disputed facts or
differing interpretations of the benefit plan. 108 Arbitration is an ap-
propriate means of settling such disputes. 10 9 As noted in the Steel-
workers Trilogy, the arbitrator is an expert in the "law of the
shop," 110 the industrial "milieu""' in which the plan was formed.
The virtues of an arbitrator as fact finder and contract-interpreter
that were highlighted in the Steelworkers Trilogy apply here with
equal force. 112 For example, in Delaney v. Union Carbide Corp., 113 the
collectively bargained employee benefit plan provided for arbitra-
tion before a medical board following denials of disability benefits.
The plaintiff exhausted the grievance procedures and was denied
benefits by the board."14 In a subsequent ERISA action, the Eighth
Circuit upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment for
Union Carbide, stating:
plaintiff alleges simply that he is in fact totally and permanently
disabled, that the decision of the medical arbitrator to the con-
trary is incorrect, and that he is therefore entitled to benefits
under the plan. That is the very sort of question that a medical
arbitration board is most qualified to address .... 115
105 See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
106 See St. Antoine, supra note 22, at 1141-42.
107 See Adams v. Gould, Inc., 687 F.2d 27, 32-33 (3d Cir. 1982) (parties bound by
bargained choice of arbitration remedy), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1085 (1983).
108 See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
109 Cf. Murphy, supra note 29, at 131 ("If [ERISA] succeeds in its purpose, there will
be a dramatic increase in employee claims for welfare and pension benefits. Arbitration
has been used in many contexts as a means of coping with an increased volume of litiga-
tion; it should have the same attraction here.").
110 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
111 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570 (1960) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
112 See, e.g., Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 752 F.2d 923, 939 (3d Cir.
1985) ("contractually-based pension claims [are] subject to arbitral resolution just as
contractually-based claims for breach of a collective-bargaining agreement have been
held to be subject to arbitral resolution"); Adams v. Gould, Inc., 687 F.2d 27, 32 (3d
Cir. 1982) (dispute over benefit denial under plan a "classic case for arbitration"), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1085 (1983). See generally Schneider, supra note 81, at 294-95.
113 749 F.2d 17 (8th Cir. 1984).
114 Id. at 18.
115 Id. at 19.
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The court properly held that the arbitral award precluded a subse-
quent suit for benefits under the plan's terms. Thus, courts should
not review the merits of an arbitrator's decision in a subsequent
benefit claim under section 502(a) (1) (B).
The contractual nature of collective bargaining agreements fur-
ther supports judicial deference to arbitral results. Courts should
refuse to review arbitral awards in section 502 (a)(1)(B) because the
parties to the arbitration agreed to be so bound. For the same rea-
sons that claimants should be required to exhaust arbitral reme-
dies, 116 the results of such proceedings should preclude a
subsequent suit challenging the benefit denial.
In summary, courts should require claimants seeking section
502 (a) (1) (B) judicial review of benefit denials to exhaust administra-
tive procedures before bringing suit, regardless of whether those
procedures consist of internal review by plan administrators or
binding arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement.
Similarly, save narrow exceptions, 117 courts should not disturb the
results of these administrative procedures in subsequent section
502(a)(1)(B) suits.
B. Claims Alleging Violations of ERISA's Substantive
Standards-Section 502(a)(3) Actions
ERISA does not impose an affirmative duty on employers to of-
fer benefit plans. 1 8 However, once an employer offers a plan, ER-
ISA establishes substantive standards with which the plan must
comply. 119 A plan participant may bring suit in federal court under
ERISA section 502 (a) (3)120 for breach of one of these statutory stan-
dards. Unlike their treatment of plan-based actions under section
502(a) (1) (B), courts should require exhaustion of section 502(a) (3)
claims only when administrative procedures would serve to develop
the case factually. Moreover, the results of the administrative pro-
cess should not preclude the claimant's access to federal court in a
subsequent section 502 (a) (3) action. Rather, in such actions federal
courts should conduct de novo review of the claim. Congressional
intent and analogies to other areas of labor law support this distinc-
116 See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
117 A fiduciary's denial of benefits may be reversed if arbitrary and capricious. See
supra text accompanying note 99. A court may overturn an arbitrator's decision if she
exceeded her authority as defined by the collective bargaining agreement. See supra note
21 and accompanying text; see also supra note 27 and accompanying text.
118 See Viggiano v. Shenango China Div. of Anchor Hocking Corp., 750 F.2d 276,
279 (3d Cir. 1984) ("ERISA does not require an employer to establish a hospitalization
plan nor continue it indefinitely.").
119 See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
120 See supra note 5.
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tion between claims for benefits under section 502(a)(1)(B) and ac-
tions to enforce ERISA's substantive guarantees under section
502(a)(3).
1. Congressional Intent
Although Congress expressly intended that section
502(a) (1)(B) claims be subordinate to the federal policy favoring ad-
ministrative resolution of labor disputes, it declined to expressly
subordinate rights-enforcement actions under section 502(a)(3) to
this policy. Moreover, Congress's objectives of establishing uniform
standards for plan management and facilitating recovery on valid
claims that allege substantive ERISA violations are inconsistent with
imposition of an exhaustion requirement and deference to the ad-
ministrative result.
Congress invoked LMRA section 301 in reference only to plan-
based claims under section 502(a)(1)(B).12' It avoided doing so
with respect to claims alleging substantive ERISA violations under
section 502(a)(3). 122 Had Congress intended that courts apply the
federal policy favoring administrative resolution of claims to ERISA
rights-enforcement actions, it could have easily so provided. Yet
Congress avoided linking LMRA section 301 to section 502(a)(3)
actions. This suggests that the presumption of arbitrability and cor-
responding exhaustion requirement and the traditional deference to
arbitral awards 123 should not apply to claims under section
502(a)(3).
Congress's desire to establish uniform standards for the regula-
tion of benefit plans further supports providing claimants alleging
statutory violations of ERISA with unimpeded access to federal
courts. Section 514(e) provides that the Act displaces existing state
law in the field of employee benefit plans. 124 ERISA's broad pre-
emption of state law is designed to promote uniformity in the en-
121 See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
122 Neither the portion of the conference report of the Act that links LMRA § 301(a)
with ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) nor any other part of the report says anything about ERISA
§ 502(a)(3) on this matter. See Donaldson, supra note 81, at 229.
The Secretary of Labor's regulations governing the use of internal claims proce-
dures and arbitration to resolve claims disputes do not pertain to actions alleging viola-
tions of ERISA: "This section sets out certain minimum requirements for employee
benefit plan procedures pertaining to claims by participants and beneficiaries (claim-
ants) for plan benefits, consideration of such claims, and review of claim denials .... "
29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(a) (1985). The regulations do not mention actions to enforce
rights granted by ERISA. See also Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747, 751 (9th
Cir. 1984) ("We are faced solely with an alleged violation of a protection afforded by
ERISA. There is no internal appeal procedure either mandated or recommended by
ERISA to hear these claims.").
123 See supra notes 14-27 and accompanying text.
124 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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forcement of pension rights and to "help administrators, fiduciaries
and participants to predict the legality of proposed actions without
the necessity of reference to varying state laws."' 125 The strength of
the federal interest in uniform standards is evidenced by section
502(e) (1), which vests exclusive jurisdiction for substantive ERISA
rights actions with federal courts, while both state and federal courts
may entertain suits challenging benefits denials. 126 Similarly, sec-
tion 502(a)(5)127 permits the Secretary of Labor to file suit or join in
an existing suit alleging violations of ERISA's substantive standards.
In contrast, the government may not join in or file suits alleging a
denial of benefits.
Uniformity is best promoted by permitting section 502(a)(3)
claimants access to federal courts despite prior agreements to arbi-
trate or internal claims procedures. Because judges are bound by
precedent and must state reasons for their decisions, they are more
likely to formulate clear, articulate, uniform standards of conduct
than are either arbitrators or plan administrators.' 28 Furthermore,
judges are expert at applying the law; the expertise of arbitrators
lies elsewhere. 129 Congress must have intended that judges, not ar-
bitrators or plan administrators, serve as the ultimate interpreters of
ERISA's statutory standards. Therefore, prior agreements to arbi-
trate or internal claims procedures should not interfere with a sec-
tion 502(a)(3) claimant's right to obtain access to federal courts.'5 0
125 SEN. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 29 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4838, 4865. See also, e.g., Authier v. Ginsberg, 757 F.2d 796, 802 (6th
Cir.) (Congress preempted "state laws to provide a uniform source of law"), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 208 (1985); Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208, 1215 (8th
Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968, 1084 (1981).
Prior to the enactment of ERISA, no federal cause of action existed for breach of
fiduciary duty. Claimants had to rely on state fiduciary doctrines, which provided a myr-
iad of standards. ERISA established one uniform standard. See Donaldson, supra note
81, at 228-29.
126 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (1982). One commentator noted the significance of this
distinction: "Congress may have provided a jurisdictional base for plan-enforcement
actions that is broader than the exclusive federal jurisdiction for federal-rights actions
because the federal interest is not nearly as strong in plan enforcement [sic] actions as it
is in federal-rights actions, in which the integrity of ERISA's regulatory scheme is at
stake." Note, supra note 81, at 743.
127 ERISA § 502(a)(5) provides:
A civil action may be brought-
... by the Secretary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any
provision of this subchapter, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable
relief (i) to redress such violation or (ii) to enforce any provision of this
subchapter[.]
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(5) (1982).
128 See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 81, at 285 (arbitration not appropriate for fiduciary
breach claims because uniform standard is desirable).
129 See supra notes 22, 110-15 and accompanying text.
130 ERISA § 514(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1982), which provides that ERISA does
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These concerns are not implicated in a benefit claim action under
section 502(a)(1)(B). Yet they suggest that courts should provide de
novo review of rights-enforcement actions under section 502(a)(3).
Congress also passed ERISA to protect the interests of partici-
pants of employee benefit plans.13 ' Congress intended that civil
suits by participants serve as the primary means of enforcing ER-
ISA's standards.' 3 2 To maximize enforcement, Congress relaxed
venue requirements and procedural barriers to suit.1 33 Permitting
claimants alleging statutory violations unimpeded access to federal
courts would best promote Congress's protective goal. Therefore,
courts should not impose an exhaustion requirement on claimants
alleging statutory violations of ERISA, and should accord little
weight to prior administrative results in a subsequent section
502(a) (3) suit.134
not supersede any other federal law, does not undermine this conclusion. In the context
of § 502(a)(1)(B) claims, § 514(d) suggests that the federal policy favoring arbitration of
labor disputes should remain in place. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. How-
ever, prior to the enactment of ERISA, states regulated pension plans. ERISA occupies
a field never directly addressed by Congress or the federal courts prior to 1974. Thus,
other than the LMRA, ERISA had no substantive federal law to supersede.
131 ERISA § 2(b) states that the Act's purpose is "to protect ... the interests of
participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, ... by establishing stan-
dards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans,
and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal
courts." 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1982). See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90
(1983) ("ERISA is a comprehensive statute designed to promote the interests of em-
ployees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans.").
132 "Mhe Committee has placed the principal focus of the enforcement effort on
anticipated civil litigation to be initiated by the Secretary of Labor as well as participants
and beneficiaries." H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973), reprinted in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4639, 4640.
133 ERISA § 502(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(1) (1982). ERISA further provides that
participants may sue the employee benefit plan itself. Id.
134 Arguably, courts should not enforce prior agreements to arbitrate fiduciary
breach claims. ERISA § 410(a) provides that "any provision in an agreement or instru-
ment which purports to relieve a fiduciary from responsibility or liability for any respon-
sibility, obligation, or duty under this part shall be void as against public policy." 29
U.S.C. § 1110(a) (1982). ERISA § 409(a) provides that answering a civil action is a con-
sequence of liability for breach of fiduciary duty. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1982). Courts
have construed the term "liability" such that venue provisions, expanded jurisdiction,
and other "fringe benefits" conferred by a statute may be considered attributes of liabil-
ity under federal protective legislation. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 437
(1953) (securities law); Boyd v. Grand Trunk W. Ry., 338 U.S. 263, 266 (1949) (Federal
Employers' Liability Act); Lewis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 431 F.
Supp. 271, 277 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (ERISA). ERISA provides claimants with "fringe bene-
fits" which ease access to federal courts. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. A
prior agreement to arbitrate fiduciary breach claims could relieve a fiduciary of aspects
of liability and should therefore be unenforceable under § 410(a). As the court stated in
Lewis v. Merrill Lynch, "The right to select the forum and the mode of trial is part and
parcel of 'liability,' itself." 431 F. Supp. at 277.
This prohibition of exculpatory clauses reaches fiduciary breach claims only and
does not apply to substantive provisions of ERISA generally. See Donaldson, supra note
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As the above elements of ERISA's legislative history and statu-
tory aims demonstrate, courts should distinguish between benefit
claims under section 502(a)(1)(B) and rights-enforcement actions
under section 502(a)(3). Courts should not extend the traditional
labor policy favoring administrative resolution of labor disputes to
actions alleging violations of ERISA's statutory standards.
2. Expansion of Federal Law into the Employer/Employee
Relationship
Increasingly, Congress has exerted its authority over the em-
ployer/employee relationship. 135 Courts have recognized and
struggled with the tension between the traditional federal policy
favoring administrative resolution of labor disputes and the need to
vindicate newly conferred employee rights. An examination of how
courts have resolved this tension under other federal laws supports
the conclusion that courts should not dilute a claimant's right to fed-
eral court adjudication of alleged violations of ERISA's substantive
standards by requiring exhaustion of administrative procedures and
deferring to administrative results.
a. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver-MTitle VII. In Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 136 an employee alleging a violation of the non-
discrimination clause in his collective bargaining agreement submit-
ted a grievance to binding arbitration pursuant to that agreement.
After losing in arbitration, the employee filed suit under tide VIII37
in federal district court, which dismissed the action on the ground
that the arbitral award precluded the subsequent suit.138 A unani-
mous Supreme Court held that the arbitrator's denial of the claim
did not foreclose the employee's right to subsequent de novo review
in federal court under tide VII even though the suit arose from the
same facts as the arbitrated grievance. The Court reasoned that tide
VII rights exist independent of contractual rights, even though the
employment contract was the trigger that brought title VII into
play. 139 The contractual and statutory remedies represented two
distinct means of vindicating the employee's rights. The Court drew
81, at 227-30 (arguing that federal courts should not defer to arbitration process when
deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction over fiduciary breach claims).
Courts face a difficult problem when a participant invokes § 502(a)(1)(B) to chal-
lenge a benefit denial under the plan's terms and also alleges that the administrator's
interpretation of the plan constitutes a breach of her fiduciary duty. See infra notes 181-
84 and accompanying text.
135 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
136 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
137 Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. vii, §§ 701-718, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(1982).
138 415 U.S. at 42-43. The Tenth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 43.
139 Id. at 49-50.
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a distinction between rights collectively conferred on all employees
by the collective bargaining agreement and rights bestowed on each
employee individually by the federal statute, holding that the exist-
ence of the former did not dilute the latter.140
In declining to defer to the arbitrator's decision, the Court con-
cluded that "[a]rbitral procedures, while well suited to the resolu-
tion of contractual disputes, make arbitration a comparatively
inappropriate forum for the final resolution of rights created by Ti-
tle VI'' First, the Court explained, the arbitrator's power de-
rives from his special ability to interpret the collective bargaining
agreement. Thus, the arbitrator's role is to effectuate the parties'
intent under the contract, not to uphold the federal policy ex-
pressed in tide VII.142 Second, "the specialized competence of arbi-
trators pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the
land."' 143 The legislative history of title VII indicates that Congress
placed ultimate authority for its enforcement in the courts, relying
upon judicial construction to effectuate its aims and policies.' 44
Last, claimants enjoy greater protections in judicial (as opposed to
arbitral) proceedings, including development of a more complete
record, use of the rules of evidence, adherence to precedent, and
greater procedural formality. 145 The Court refrained from dis-
missing arbitration altogether, expressly permitting the introduc-
tion of arbitral results as evidence at a later trial without indicating
the weight they should be accorded.' 46 Nonetheless, subsequent
140 Id. The Court stated:
inhere can be no prospective waiver of an employee's rights under Title
VII. It is true, of course, that a union may waive certain statutory rights
related to collective activity, such as the right to strike.... These rights
are conferred on employees collectively to foster the processes of bar-
gaining and properly may be exercised or relinquished by the union as
collective-bargaining agent to obtain economic benefits for union mem-
bers. Title VII, on the other hand, stands on plainly different ground; it
concerns not majoritarian processes, but an individual's right to equal
employment opportunities. Title VII's structures ... command that each
employee be free from discriminatory practices.
Id. at 51 (citations omitted).
141 Id. at 56.
142 Id. at 56-57.
143 Id. at 57.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 The Court stated:
We adopt no standards as to the weight to be accorded an arbitral
decision, since this must be determined in the court's discretion with re-
gard to the facts and circumstances of each case. Relevant factors include
the existence of provisions in the collective-bargaining agreement that
conform substantially with Title VII, the degree of procedural fairness in
the arbitral forum, adequacy of the record with respect to the issue of
discrimination, and the special competence of particular arbitrators.
Where an arbitral determination gives full consideration to an em-
977
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
courts have held that under Alexander, title VII claimants need not
exhaust arbitral remedies before bringing suit.147
b. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best-Fair Labor Standards Act. The
erosion of judicial deference to arbitral results begun in Alexander
continued in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. 148 The Bar-
rentine Court held that an employee could bring suit in federal court
based on rights arising out of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
(FLSA) 149 notwithstanding the prior completion of arbitration re-
quired by a collective bargaining agreement. Barrentine demon-
strates that the erosion of deference to arbitration reached beyond
statutes of the "highest priority," like title VII, 150 extending to other
federal laws, such as the FLSA. The Court stated, "While courts
should defer to an arbitral decision where the employee's claim is
based on rights arising out of the collective-bargaining agreement,
different considerations apply where the employee's claim is based
on rights arising out of a statute designed to provide minimum sub-
stantive guarantees to individual workers."' 151
The Court reasoned that many of the same infirmities in the
arbitral process that the Alexander Court highlighted were present in
this case, adding that the FLSA specifically provides broad access to
courts and does not expressly require exhaustion. 152 In addition,
the Court saw no guarantee that a union, as an employee's represen-
tative, would vigorously pursue his claim in arbitration, for its inter-
ests might not be synonymous with his. 153 Furthermore, the
arbitrator might very well be powerless to provide the relief that the
employee is entitled to under the statute.1 54 Finally, although the
ployee's Title VII rights, a court may properly accord it great weight.
This is especially true where the issue is solely one of fact, specifically
addressed by the parties and decided by the arbitrator on the basis of an
adequate record. But courts should ever be mindful that Congress, in enacting
Title VII, thought it necessary to provide ajudicialforum for the ultimate resolution
of discriminatory employment claims. It is the duty of courts to assure the full availa-
bility of this forum.
Id. at 60 n.21 (emphasis added). See generally Castle & Lansing, supra note 29.
147 See, e.g., Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 714-15 (7th Cir. 1969);
King v. Georgia Power Co., 295 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
148 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
149 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982).
150 See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (title VII's
objectives were of "highest priority").
151 450 U.S. at 737.
152 Id. at 740.
153 Id. at 742. The Court continued, "Because the arbitrator is required to effectu-
ate the intent of the parties, rather than to enforce the statute, he may issue a ruling that
is inimical to the public policies underlying the FLSA, thus depriving an employee of
protected statutory rights." Id. at 744.
154 "[Nlot only are arbitral procedures less protective of individual statutory rights
than are judicial procedures, . . . but arbitrators very often are powerless to grant the
aggrieved employees as broad a range of relief." Id. at 744-45 (citation omitted).
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arbitrator may be competent to determine factual issues, he may
lack the skill necessary to decide the ultimate legal issue: the em-
ployer's compliance with the FLSA. 155 That decision is best left to
the court.
c. Other Federal Laws. Title VII 156 and the FLSA 157 are only
two of the federal statutes deemed sufficiently important to warrant
de novo judicial review of claims brought under them despite prior
agreements to arbitrate. In Wilko v Swan, 158 the Court held that an
agreement to arbitrate disputes arising out of securities transactions
between a customer and a broker was unenforceable and could not
foreclose a civil action under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of
1933.159 Similarly, claimants need not arbitrate federal antitrust
claims 160 and civil rights actions 16 1 in spite of prior agreements to
do so.
d. Implications for ERISA Civil Suits. Alexander and Barrentine
point toward an accommodation between the ERISA provisions
granting access to federal courts and the traditional labor policy
favoring administrative dispute resolution. For the same reasons
that the Supreme Court required de novo review of the claims in
Alexander and Barrentine, courts should not impede access to federal
courts for section 502(a)(3) claims alleging violations of ERISA's
substantive standards.
155 Id. at 743.
156 See supra notes 136-47 and accompanying text.
157 See supra notes 148-55 and accompanying text.
158 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
159 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982). The Court deemed the agreement to arbitrate void
under § 14 of the Act, which forbids stipulations amounting to a waiver of compliance
with the Act's provisions. The Court noted the unequal bargaining power of a customer
and a broker, Congress's strongly worded desire to protect customers, and the likeli-
hood that Congress's aims would be better upheld in courts. 346 U.S. at 435. See also
Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532, 536-37 (3d Cir.)
(extending Wilho to Securities Exchange Act of 1934), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976).
160 See, e.g., Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41, 47 (5th Cir. 1974); A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v.
Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710, 715-16 (9th Cir. 1968); American Safety Equip. Corp. v.
J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827-28 (2d Cir. 1968). But see Wilson v. Pye, No. 85 C
6341 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 1986) (available on WESTLAW, Federal DCT database).
161 McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984). The Court held that a
discharged employee who unsuccessfully exhausted his arbitral remedies was not pre-
cluded from later filing suit alleging that his employers violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)
by firing him for exercising his first amendment rights. The Court stated, "[Allthough
arbitration is well suited to resolving contractual disputes, our decisions in Barrentine and
Gardner-Denver compel the conclusion that it cannot provide an adequate substitute for a
judicial proceeding in protecting the federal statutory and constitutional rights that
§ 1983 is designed to safeguard." 466 U.S. at 290.
The Supreme Court has ruled that prior agreements to arbitrate do not preclude
civil claims under other federal statutes. See, e.g., U.S. Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles,
400 U.S. 351 (1971) (Seaman's Wages Act); McKinney v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R.,
357 U.S. 265, 268-70 (1958) (Universal Military Training and Service Act).
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In enacting ERISA, Congress stressed the importance of setting
minimum uniform standards for the administration of employee
benefit plans. 162 These standards can best be enforced by granting
litigants access to federal courts regardless of prior prospective
agreements to arbitrate. 163 In Alexander and Barrentine, the Supreme
Court recognized that arbitration cannot adequately vindicate fed-
eral statutory protections. 164 Those criticisms apply equally to
claims alleging violations of ERISA's substantive rights.
Similarly, the presence of internal claims procedures should not
diminish a claimant's right to obtain de novo review of a claim under
section 502(a)(3) alleging a violation of ERISA's substantive stan-
dards. By requiring exhaustion of intrafund procedures and then
treating the administrative results with great deference, courts
would deny claimants the substantive protections ERISA provides.
This is not to say that exhaustion of internal claims procedures
should be dispensed with entirely. Such proceedings may develop a
factual record, sharpen the dispute, or even satisfy the claimant at
the administrative level. But as the Alexander Court cautioned,
"courts should ever be mindful"'165 that Congress provided a judi-
cial forum for the ultimate resolution of claims alleging violations of
substantive rights created by federal statutes, such as ERISA. The
availability of administrative procedures, whatever their nature,
should not hinder the claimants' vindication of those rights.
The Alexander Court's distinction between individual and collec-
tive rights 166 serves to highlight the difference between suits to col-
lect benefits under a plan and suits to uphold ERISA's statutory
standards. Typically, management confers rights under an em-
162 See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
163 One commentator argues that arbitration is only efficient if it is final; otherwise,
arbitration is merely one more time-consuming and costly step. Note, Arbitration and
Collectively Bargained Benefit Funds: Trustee Collection Choices after Robbins v. Prosser, 37 ARK.
L. REV. 440, 453, 455 (1983). Therefore, because arbitral results should not be final,
courts should not require exhaustion of arbitral remedies.
Furthermore, commentators have increasingly attacked the efficacy of arbitration.
For example, one of the assumptions upon which the Steelworkers policy favoring arbitra-
tion relies is that union and management will agree upon an arbitrator because of their
faith in his knowledge of the "law of the shop." See supra note 22. However, arbitrators
are not necessarily expert. P. HAYS, LABOR ARBrrAnON: A DISSENING VIEW 54 (1966);
Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916, 930 (1979). Frequently
the parties' choice is based solely on a desire for victory and the perception that a given
arbitrator will prove sympathetic. Castle & Lansing, supra note 29, at 61-62. The arbi-
trator may be pressured to "split the claim," rather than decide the dispute on the mer-
its. Id. Although arbitration has frequently been touted as a means of avoiding the costs
and delays that attend civil litigation, these benefits may be exaggerated. Id. at 62.
164 See supra notes 141-45, 152-55 and accompanying text.
165 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 n.21 (1974). See supra note
146.
166 415 U.S. at 49-50. See supra note 140.
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ployee benefit plan upon employees collectively. As such, these
plans are properly the subject of collective bargaining.' 67 The fed-
eral labor policy, as embodied in the LMRA, provides that individ-
ual rights to file suit for breach of a collective bargaining agreement
be subordinated to collectively established administrative proce-
dures.168 Therefore, claimants seeking benefits under a plan should
be bound by prospective agreements to arbitrate, and should be re-
quired to exhaust administrative remedies. In contrast, Congress es-
tablished ERISA's statutory standards to protect the rights of
participants as individuals. 169 Like tide VII and the FLSA, ERISA's
aims and legislative history170 require that these individual rights be
vindicated in federal courts. Thus, courts should entertain jurisdic-
tion over suits under section 502 (a)(3) despite the availability of ad-
ministrative dispute resolution procedures. 171
C. Analysis ofJudicial Recognition of the Distinction Between
Section 502(a)(1)(B) Actions and Section 502(a)(3)
Actions
Much of the confusion in the case law stems from the failure of
some courts to distinguish between statutory and contractual (or,
alternatively, individual and collective) rights under ERISA. For ex-
ample, in Kross v. Western Electric Co., '7 2 the court gave full force to
the federal policy favoring administrative resolution of labor dis-
putes without giving due regard to the underlying source of the
plaintiff's claim-a violation of a substantive ERISA right.173
167 Any term in a collective bargaining agreement which relates to wages, hours, or
other conditions of employment is a mandatory subject of bargaining under LMRA
§ 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 157(d) (1982). Pension benefits are deemed wages and are therefore
subject to the LMRA. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247, 253-54 (7th Cir. 1948),
cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949). See Glanzer, The Impact of ERISA on Collective Bargaining,
52 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 531, 548 (1978).
168 See supra notes 14-27 and accompanying text.
169 See Castle & Lansing, supra note 29, at 72. The authors argue that individuals
need greater protection, and that federal law recognizes that need. Id. Further, the
union-the collective entity-is likely to submerge individual interests in the bargaining
process. Id.
ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982) forbids discrimination based on pension sta-
tus. See supra note 42. This parallels the individual protection provided employees by
title VII, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982), and the FLSA, see 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1982). As
the Court noted in both Alexander and Barrentine, the arbitrator's expertise applies less to
the vindication of individual rights than to enforcement of collectively bargained rights
and duties. See supra notes 141-45, 152-55 and accompanying text.
170 See supra notes 121-34 and accompanying text.
171 The Alexander Court suggested that a court need not disregard the results of any
prior administrative proceedings in a subsequent suit under ERISA § 502(a)(3). See
supra note 146 and accompanying text.
172 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1983). See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
173 The Kross court noted that the claimant brought suit under § 502(a)(3). Never-
theless, it concluded that courts could require exhaustion wholly at their discretion. 701
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Other courts have appreciated this distinction and shaped their
decisions accordingly. For example, in an action alleging a violation
of ERISA section 510174 (the same section implicated in Kross), the
Ninth Circuit in Amaro v. Continental Can Co. 17 5 held that the rights
involved in the employees' contractual claim before the arbitrator
were independent of those in their statutory claim under ERISA,
even though each claim presented the same factual issue. 176 Simi-
larly, the Third Circuit in Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co. 177
held that in spite of a valid, binding agreement to arbitrate, the
claimant retained the right to seek court review of his statute-based
claims. After noting the friction between enforcing the agreement
to arbitrate and providing a federal forum to vindicate ERISA's
standards, the court stated:
[T]he most reasonable accommodation is to hold that claims to
establish or enforce rights to benefits ... that are independent of
claims based on violations of the substantive provisions of ERISA
are subject to arbitration .... while claims of statutory violations
can be brought in a federal court notwithstanding an agreement
to arbitrate. . . . Under the distinction we make between statutory and
contractual claims, ERISA neither completely supplants nor is completely
subordinate to arbitration.178
This distinction between statutory and contractual claims also
applies to intrafund procedures providing for review by the plan ad-
ministrator. Section 502(a)(1)(B) claims remain subject to the fed-
eral policy favoring administrative resolution of labor disputes.
Courts should require that claimants under section 502(a)(1) (B) ex-
F.2d at 1244. Cases following Kross include: Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 763
F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 863 (1986); King v.James River-Pep-
perell, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 54 (D. Mass. 1984); Delisi v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 580 F.
Supp. 1572 (W.D. Pa. 1984).
174 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982). See supra note 42.
175 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1984).
176 Id. at 749. Amaro was followed in: Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 752
F.2d 923, 939, 941 (3d Cir. 1985); Garry v. TRW, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 157, 163 (N.D.
Ohio 1985); McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1492, 1503-04 (D.N.J.
1985) ("[W]hat is at issue here is not the enforcement of contractual rights, for which
ERISA merely provides a federal forum, but the enforcement of the substantive right
against discrimination on the basis of pension eligibility."); Grywczynski v. Shasta Bever-
ages, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 61 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
177 752 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1985).
178 Id. at 939 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
The district court had stayed plaintiff's ERISA claims pending the outcome of arbi-
tration, later dismissing the ERISA claims in deference to the arbitral result. Id. at 928-
29. On appeal, the Third Circuit reinstated the ERISA claims, remanding the case to the
district court to determine whether the arbitral award could stand in light of the rein-
statement of the ERISA claims. The court concluded that arbitration, while valid and
binding with respect to plaintiff's contractual claims, could not be compelled with re-
spect to claims alleging violations of ERISA's accounting requirements. Id. at 740.
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haust administrative remedies and, subject to review under the arbi-
trary and capricious standard, 7 9 should bind them to the results.
However, the federal policy favoring administrative resolution of la-
bor disputes should not govern section 502(a)(3) claims. Courts
still might properly require exhaustion, but should do so only when
the administrative process will serve to develop the facts of the dis-
pute. Courts should require exhaustion of intrafund procedures as a
pragmatic means of developing the record or satisfying the claimant
at the administrative level.' 80 In any event, the claimant should re-
tain the right to seek de novo review of her 502(a)(3) claim in fed-
eral court.
Admittedly, distinguishing between actions under a plan's
terms and those alleging violations of ERISA's substantive stan-
dards may be difficult. A claimant might allege both that an admin-
istrator improperly interpreted the plan in denying benefits and that
the administrator breached his duties as plan fiduciary. Conceiva-
bly, these claims could arise from precisely the same facts. For ex-
ample in Wilson v. Fischer & Porter Co. Pension Plan'8 ' an arbitrator
endorsed the plan administrators' interpretation of the claimant's
right to benefits. In a subsequent ERISA suit, the plaintiff alleged
that the plan administrators breached their duty as fiduciaries when
they denied her claim. 182 The district court dismissed the suit,
stating:
although plaintiff claims to assert her rights under ERISA, the
gravamen of her complaint is the interpretation of the Plan and
the collective bargaining agreement. Her dissatisfaction with the
results of the arbitration before an impartial arbitrator does not
give her cause to adjudicate the matter de novo before this
court. 1
8 3
This case demonstrates that the contractual/statutory distinction is
not always an easy one to make. If contractual and statutory claims
overlap, courts should divide the claim, deferring to administrative
179 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
180 One might argue that if administrative procedures are to be granted any weight
at all, they serve a useful function and should therefore be exhausted before claimants
bring an action into federal court under § 502(a)(3). This position presents the risk that
claimants will exhaust their financial resources, leaving nothing to pay for subsequent
litigation. Further, courts might habitually defer to administrative results, denying
claimants the de novo review of statutory claims which ERISA § 502(a)(3) clearly war-
rants. Therefore, courts should err on the side of the dispensing with the exhaustion
requirement.
181 551 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
182 The court did not specify which ERISA section supported jurisdiction-
502(a)(1)(B) or 502(a)(3)-stating simply that the plaintiff "brings this action under
§ 502 of" ERISA. Id.
183 Id. at 595.
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resolution of contractual claims and providing an independent judi-
cial forum to hear statutory claims. 184
A claimant's choice of jurisdictional label-section 502(a)(1)(B)
or section 502(a)(3)-should not control. Proceeding on a case-by-
case basis, courts can determine whether the underlying claim ulti-
mately relies on section 502(a) (1) (B) or section 502(a) (3), giving full
play to the federal policy favoring administrative resolution of labor
disputes to the former, and freely asserting jurisdiction over the
latter.
CONCLUSION
ERISA section 502(a), which provides employee benefit plan
participants access to federal courts, is not wholly compatible with
the longstanding federal labor policy favoring exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies and deference to administrative results. Unsur-
prisingly, courts faced with this tension have reached different
results. Nevertheless, ERISA's aims and statutory scheme provide a
means of properly reconciling these conflicting goals.
When deciding whether to require that participants bringing
suit under ERISA exhaust grievance procedures or what effect to
give the resulting awards, courts should focus on the source of the
plaintiffs' claims. If an action challenges a benefit denial and is ulti-
mately based on factual eligibility under the terms of the plan or the
proper interpretation of the plan, a court should give full force to
the federal policy favoring administrative resolution of labor dis-
putes. Thus, the court should require exhaustion of administrative
procedures and defer to the administrative result.
However, if the action alleges a violation of ERISA's substan-
tive guarantees, the arbitral result should not preclude a subsequent
claim. A court should require exhaustion only when administrative
procedures would serve to develop the facts or issues without preju-
dicing the claimant's rights under the Act. The legislative history
and underlying aims of the Act suggest that courts should not
subordinate the right of participants to seek enforcement of ER-
ISA's substantive protections to the federal labor policy favoring ar-
bitration. The erosion of this policy in other areas of labor law
184 This is the balance struck by the court in Barrowclough. See supra note 178. The
court stayed the statutory claim pending the outcome of arbitration, thus mitigating the
inefficiency accompanying the simultaneous pursuit of both contractual and statutory
remedies.
In a sense, dividing a claim is inefficient if administrative procedures would resolve
the entire dispute. Yet such "inefficiency" flows from the creation of any federal cause of
action designed to protect individuals, be it title VII, the FLSA or ERISA. Congress
deemed employee benefit plan participants worthy of protection; the courts should not
withhold such protection in the name of efficiency.
[Vol. 71:952984
1986] ERISA: ARBITRAL/INTRAFUND REMEDIES 985
further demonstrates that the vindication of the substantive rights
ERISA confers on employee benefit plan participants ultimately
rests with the federal courts.
Whitman F. Manley
